

VZCZCXRO2878
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHAK #1244 1421356
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 221356Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2221
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY

S E C R E T ANKARA 001244

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2022

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [TU](#) [IZ](#)

SUBJECT: TURKEY: ONE MFA VIEW ON THE MILITARY

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) A trusted mid-level MFA contact who works on Iraq issues confided to us May 21 that TGS is taking a more assertive role in day-to-day foreign policy questions, especially as the country's domestic political crisis deepens. With FonMin Gul increasingly distracted by election processes, TGS is putting pressure on the Ministry's policy apparatus. Our contact told us that the military consistently presses his boss, GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Celikkol, to justify the MFA's positions on issues such as continuing the Ralston initiative on the PKK and engagement with the Iraqi government. He expressed frustration that TGS is apparently so persuaded of U.S. and GOI ill will on the Kirkuk question, it even believes that a UN role to mediate the problem would simply amount to international legitimization of Kurdish annexation of the province.

¶2. (S) Our contact complained that even when Gul was firmly in charge at the ministry, TGS-MFA contacts took place only at a senior level; informal, working-level dialogue was unusual. He told us that his predecessor had advised him to stay in close contact with the military and Turkish intelligence, but after only a few months he learned that the military did not reciprocate in information-sharing and so he stopped this effort.

¶3. (S) The military has always had a significant -- and at times primary -- role in Turkish foreign policy, especially in security matters. It has also had a behind-the-scenes say, as has the political opposition, on so-called national consensus issues, such as Cyprus and Armenia. But what we are seeing now is a more direct involvement into day-to-day policymaking. This likely reflects concurrent trends: the military deeply distrusts the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and smells blood as the party is necessarily preoccupied with domestic politics (a situation the military itself helped precipitate). In addition, CHOD GEN Buyukanit is widely viewed as more assertive -- and less accommodating to the government -- than was his predecessor, Hilmi Ozkok. (Some aver that it was Ozkok, not Buyukanit, who was the exception to the rule in this regard.) On key issues in the months ahead, such as Iraq, we can expect the military to be involved and, where primary equities are at stake, to drive a hard-line policy approach.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/>

WILSON